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THE CENTRALISATION OF JUDICIAL POWER WITHIN THE
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM
James Stellios*
ABSTRACT
This article considers the patterns of centralisation within the federal judicial system.
While centralisation of legislative, executive and fiscal power within the federal system
has been well documented, the architecture of judicial federalism has been the subject
of less attention. The article, first, seeks to show that principles derived from Chapter
III of the Constitution have, on the whole, exhibited broadly similar centralising
characteristics and exerted centralising effects, and, secondly, offers explanations for
this centralisation.
I INTRODUCTION
The centralisation of power within the Australian federal system has been well
documented. The expansion of federal legislative power is well known. The High
Court has developed characterisation principles1 and other rules of inter retation 2 that
allow expansive readings of federal heads of legislative power.3 The federal
* Associate Professor, ANU College of Law; Barrister, NSW Bar. My thanks to Professor
Peter Cane for his valuable comments and to the anonymous referees for their very helpful
suggestions. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the ANU College of Law, the
Australian Association of Constitutional Law, Melbourne, and the Attorney-General's
Department Constitutional Law Symposium, Canberra. I am very grateful for the
comments of participants at those events, particularly the commentators in Melbourne,
Kristen Walker and Charles Parkinson. The work in this article is part of a larger project
supported under the Australian Research Council's Discovery Projects funding scheme:
DP140101218.
1 Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1; New South Wales v
Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 ('Work Choices').
2 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 ('Engineers
Case').
3 See generally Leslie Zines, 'Changing Attitudes to Federalism and its Purpose' in Robert
French, Geoffrey Lindell and Cheryl Saunders (eds), Reflections on the Australian
Constitution (Federation Press, 2003) 86; James Allan and Nicholas Aroney, 'An Uncommon
Court: How the High Court of Australia has Undermined Australian Federalism' (2008) 30
Sydney Law Review 245; Nicholas Aroney, 'Constitutional Choices in the Work Choices
Case, or What Exactly is Wrong with the Reserved Powers Doctrine' (2008) 32 Melbourne
University Law Review 1; Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian
Federation, Parliament of Australia, Australia's Federation: An Agenda for Reform (2011).
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Parliament can reach into areas traditionally regulated by the States, and achieve
purposes and pursue policies that are not obviously federal in nature. Examples
frequently given include the regulation of the environment,4 industrial relations 5 and
human rights. 6 The federal Parliament can use taxation as a regulatory tool, not just as
a means to fill the public purse.7 Furthermore, the Commonwealth can, pursuant to s
96 of the Constitution, grant money to the States under wide reaching and controlling
conditions that require States to achieve federal policy agendas and, indeed, reduce
States to instruments for the achievement of federal policy priorities.8 The control of
education and the health system are common examples identified when commentators
express concern about the federal imbalance. 9
The High Court's broad interpretations of the Commonwealth's revenue raising
power, 10 the facilitation of a federal income tax monopoly,1 1 and the narrowing (under
s 90) of state power to impose taxes on goods, 12 have all contributed to a vertical
imbalance in federal fiscal relations, and provides the potential for federal policy
domination through the use of tied grants under s 96.13 Additionally, the expansive
reach of federal executive power has provided a further foothold for the growth in
federal power,1 4 although in more recent decisions the Court has reconsidered this
expansive trend - at least so as to give the federal Parliament control over the federal
executive. 15
However, these efforts to map the dynamics of the federal system largely have been
directed to legislative, executive and fiscal federalism. 'Judicial federalism', 16 on the other
4 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 ('Tasmanian Dam Case'); Murphyores Incorporated
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1.
5 Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169; Work
Choices (2006) 229 CLR 1.
6 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168.
7 Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 1; Northern Suburbs General
Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 555; Roy Morgan Research Pty Ltd v
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 244 CLR 97.
8 See Anne Twomey, 'Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power - Pape, the Prerogative
and Nationhood Powers' (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 313.
9 See the collection of essays in Paul Kildea, Andrew Lynch and George Williams,
Tomorrow's Federation: Reforming Australian Government (Federation Press, 2012).
10 Northern Suburbs General Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 555.
11 South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373 ('First Uniform Tax Case'); Victoria v
Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575 ('Second Uniform Tax Case').
12 Ha v New South Wales (2007) 189 CLR 465.
13 Anne Twomey, 'The Future of Australian Federalism - Following the Money' (2009) 24
Australasian Parliamentary Review 11; Alan Fenna, 'Commonwealth Fiscal Powers and
Australian Federalism' (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 509.
14 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1; Cheryl Saunders, 'The Sources and
Scope of Commonwealth Power to Spend - Case Note; Pape v Federal Commissioner of
Taxation' (2009) 20 Public Law Review 256; Twomey, above n 13; Andrew McLeod, 'The
Executive and Financial Powers of the Commonwealth: Pape v Commissioner of Taxation'
(2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 123.
15 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156; Williams v Commonwealth (2014) 88 ALJR 701.
16 An expression that I have adopted from Gavan Griffith and Geoffrey Kennett, 'Judicial
Federalism' in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System
(Melbourne University Press, 2000) 37.
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hand, has not been the subject of sustained consideration. There is excellent work that
has demonstrated the increased significance of Ch III and Commonwealth judicial
power.1 7 However, contributions on the federal dynamics of Ch III are relatively rare.1 8
Stephen McLeish SC has provided a valuable entry into this field by exploring the
increased 'convergence of constitutional principles applicable to State and federal
polities ... and a convergence of common law and constitutional principles'. 1 9 Other
recent contributions have started to populate this field. In an insightful article, Brendan
Lim has sought to reclaim the Kable principle as a 'doctrine of federalism', 20 and
Gabrielle Appleby has argued that the harmonising effect of Kable 'has the potential to
undermine the States' capacity for experimentation and diversity in the law and order
sphere'.21
This article seeks to extend the territory further, first, by showing that Ch III
principles have, on the whole, exhibited centralising characteristics and exerted
centralising effects, and, secondly, by offering explanations for this centralisation.
II THE MARKERS OF CENTRALISATION
Expressed in broad and unrefined terms, the central argument of this article is that
there has been increased centralisation of judicial power within Australia. This
argument, however, is packed with imprecision and, as a first step, it is important to
refine the parameters of the project. Specifically, it is important to identify, first, the
markers of a federal system and, secondly, the competing conceptions of the federal and
the national that underlie Australian federalism. This section will identify these federal
dimensions, providing a framework and a language to commence mapping the federal
judicial system.
As Nicholas Aroney has explained in illuminating detail, 'conceptualising
federalism is contentious and difficult'. 22 'The basic idea', Aroney writes, 'is that of a
political system in which governmental power is divided between two territorially
defined levels of government, guaranteed by a written constitution and arbitrated by
17 See, for example, the collection of essays in Brian R Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The
Australian Federal Judicial System (Melbourne University Press, 2000); Fiona Wheeler, 'The
Rise and Rise of Judicial Power under Chapter III of the Constitution: A Decade in
Overview' (2001) 20 Australian Bar Review 283.
18 Recent collections on Australian federalism consider the judicial system sparingly: see,
Kildea, Lynch and Williams, above n 9; Gabrielle Appleby, Nicholas Aroney and Thomas
John (eds), The Future of Australian Federalism: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives
(Cambridge University Press, 2012). During the inquiry by the Senate Select Committee on
the Reform of the Australian Federation, the Attorney-General for Western Australia
highlighted the centralisation of judicial power, but the matter was not explored by the
Committee nor made the subject of a specific recommendation: see Senate Select
Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation, above n 3, 14 [1.49].
19 Stephen McLeish SC, 'The Nationalisation of the State Court System' (2013) 24 Public Law
20 Brendan Lim, 'Attributes and Attribution of State Courts - Federalism and the Kable
Principle' (2012) 40 Federal Law Review 31, 32.
21 Gabrielle Appleby, 'State Law and Order Regimes and the High Court: A Study in
Federalism and Rights Protection' (2014) Monash University Law Review (forthcoming).
22 Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of the
Australian Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 17.
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an institution independent of the two spheres of government, usually a court of final
jurisdiction'. 23 While this focus on a division of power between two levels of
government provides a marker of a federal system, for Aroney, it is an insufficient
basis for studying and mapping federal systems of government. Drawing from the
analysis of James Madison in Federalist No 39, Aroney adds additional federal markers.
Most importantly for this article are 'the ... institutions adopted under the federation'
(that is, the structure of the legislature, executive and the judiciary). 24 Importantly,
each of these federal markers reflect accommodations of federal (or, more precisely, and
to avoid confusion, 'confederal' 25) and national features. As explained by Madison in the
American context, the confederal features of these markers were characterised by a
distinctiveness of the constituent states within the federal system, whereas the national
features were characterised by an emphasis on the aggregate nation that comprised the
federal system. 26
Studies of Australian legislative and executive federalism have tended to focus on
the expansion of federal power into areas traditionally regulated by the States and the
benefits and costs associated with the uniformity which results from such centripetal
tendencies. Given the federal dimensions that characterise the legislative and executive
arms of government, questions of division of power (or, perhaps more accurately in the
Australian context, the distribution of power) and uniformity of outcomes flowing from
an expansion of federal power are a natural starting point. Aroney's analysis of
Australian federalism takes the focus beyond questions of distribution, to consider the
federal features of the structures of the federal legislature. 27 His work compellingly
demonstrates the extent to which confederal and national elements were reflected in
each of these constitutional dimensions.
This article picks up this scent and traces it through to judicial federalism. Part III
further explores the institution of government not considered by Aroney in detail -
that is, the judiciary - and will track the extent to which it is characterised by
confederal and national features. Part IV will explore the principles developed by the
High Court that exhibit a tendency to amplify the national features of the federal
judicial system, and which have resulted in a marginalisation of the confederal features
that recognised the distinctiveness of state judicial systems. In short, the article will
demonstrate that the High Court has interpreted provisions of Ch III, and developed
principles and implications arising from its text and structure, in a way that has led to
increased centralisation of judicial power within the federal judicial system. Part V will
then offer explanations, detected in the cases, for this centralising trend.
Before turning to develop that position, it is necessary briefly to sketch out the
federal architecture of Ch III.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid 21-2. Other markers identified by Aroney are the 'formative basis of the Constitution'
(that is, 'the process by which the Constitution was drafted') and the amendment process.
This project has nothing to add in that respect. As Aroney explains, these federal markers
were highlighted by James Madison in Federalist No 39 when defending the proposed US
Constitution (at 21-2).
25 Ibid 22.
26 Ibid 22-4.
27 And the formative basis for the Australian federal system and the amendment process, neither
of which is particularly relevant to the judiciary.
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III THE FEDERAL ARCHITECURE OF CHAPTER III -
DISENTANGLING THE NATIONAL AND THE CONFEDERAL
It is clear that federalism is a central organising principle in Ch III, and that federal
(both national and confederal) features can be seen operating at various levels. Four core
features of that federal architecture will be introduced in this Part.
A Federal vs state judicial power
First, and most obviously, as is the case in relation to the legislative power under Ch I
and the executive power under Ch II, Ch III of the Constitution assumes two distinct
sources of power and jurisdiction - federal and state. As French CJ and Gummow J
said in Lane v Morrison,28 '[t]he judicial power identified in Ch III is that of a body
politic, namely the Commonwealth, which is distinct from that of the States ... '. The
contrasting concepts of state and federal jurisdiction were explained by Gleeson CJ,
Gaudron and Gummow JJ in the following way in Australian Securities and Investments
Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd:29 state jurisdiction is 'the authority which State
Courts possess to adjudicate under the State Constitution and laws' and federal
jurisdiction is 'the authority to adjudicate derived from the Commonwealth
Constitution and laws'.
This federal feature was designed to mirror the federal character of the judicial
provisions in the United States Constitution. Consistently with that model, and with
the conferral of legislative power on the federal Parliament, federal judicial power was
to be limited to certain enumerated heads of jurisdiction that were appropriate to the
federal level of government. The nine heads of federal jurisdiction, as set out in ss 75
and 76 of the Constitution, had appeared in the drafts presented to the 1891
Convention by Andrew Inglis Clark and Charles Kingston 3 and largely remained
unchanged throughout the debates.3 1
Thus, the first important federal feature in Ch III can be identified as the existence
of two sources of judicial power and jurisdiction: Commonwealth and state. A separate
state judicial power and jurisdiction recognises the distinctiveness of the States within
the federal system.
B Federal and state courts
Secondly, Ch III provides the source of power for the creation of federal courts. The
High Court, itself, is created by the Constitution and, although there is no explicit
power for Parliament to create lower federal courts, such a power is necessarily
implied. 'State courts', on the other hand, 'are an essential branch of the government of
28 (2009) 239 CLR 230, 237. See also Re Wakim, Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 574
(Gummow and Hayne JJ).
29 (2001) 204 CLR 559, 570.
30 See John M Williams, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History (Melbourne
University Press, 2005) 88, 127.
31 That the content of federal jurisdiction reflected the subjects assigned to the federal
judiciary in art III of the United States Constitution was made clear by Inglis Clark when he
explained his draft clauses in the following way: 'The matters I have placed under the
jurisdiction of the Federal Judicatory are the same as those placed by the Constitution of
the United States under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the American union' (ibid
69).
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a State', 32 and the provisions of Ch III contemplate that state courts continue as
creatures of state governments. As Isaacs J said in R v Murray and Cormie,33 '[t]he
Constitution, by Chapter III, draws the clearest distinction between federal Courts and
State Courts'. Citing his Honour's comments, Knox CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ in Le Mesurier
v Connor34 added that 'the Courts of a State are the judicial organs of another
Government'.
C Federal structure of the federal judiciary - state courts to be 'federalised'
Thirdly, the structure of the institution through which Commonwealth judicial power
is exercised (that is, the federal judicature) is also federal in character. Unlike the other
two federal arms of government, the federal judicial structure is complicated by the
provision for the exercise of federal judicial power and jurisdiction by state courts -
the so-called 'autochthonous expedient'. 35 Until the Adelaide session of the 1897-8
Constitutional Convention, the institutional design of the federal judicature matched
the United States model in art III of the US Constitution: only federal courts were to
exercise federal judicial power.
However, the establishment of a complete set of lower federal courts would be an
expensive proposition and, at least for Western Australia, the extra expense was
creating apprehension. 36 The 'federalisation'3 7 of state courts provided the answer,
and the investiture of state courts with federal jurisdiction to exercise Commonwealth
judicial power was accepted from that point forward. Thus, the second federal feature
of Ch III can be seen in its structural design of the federal judicature. While the US
model of federalism dictated a complete separation of federal and state courts,
recognition of the practical difficulties of such a model in Australian conditions
resulted in a unique federal model of institutional integration for the exercise of federal
judicial power. The distinctiveness of state courts as repositories of state judicial power
and jurisdiction was qualified by the desire for a national solution for the exercise of
Commonwealth judicial power.
D High Court as a general court of appeal
While the first and second of these features emphasise the separateness or
distinctiveness of the States, the third feature reflects, to a large extent, a national
judicial structure for the exercise of federal jurisdiction: at least where the Parliament
chooses to take up the option, state courts can exercise federal judicial power alongside
(or instead of) lower federal courts.
The fourth federal feature is also a national one, and marks a second point of
departure from the US model of federalism. Whereas the US Supreme Court only
exercises appellate jurisdiction from state courts in relation to federal matters, under s
32 Re Tracey, Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 575 (Brennan and Toohey JJ); see also at 547
(Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).
33 (1916) 22 CLR 437, 452.
3 (1929) 42 CLR 481, 495.
35 R v Kirby, Ex parte Boilermakers' Society ofAustralia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 268.
36 See John A La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne University Press,
1974) 130-1; Kenneth H Bailey, 'The Federal Jurisdiction of State Courts' (1939-41) 2 Res
Judicatae 109.
37 Alfred Deakin suggested that state courts be 'federalised' during the Official Debates of the
Australasian Federation Conference, Melbourne, 10 February 1890, 26.
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73 of the Constitution, the High Court operates as a general court of appeal from state
Supreme Courts irrespective of whether the issue is federal or non-federal.
The establishment of a general court of appeal had long been on the agenda before
the Constitutional Conventions of the 1890s.38 Furthermore, as Quick and Garran
noted, the drafters were 'accustomed to a common court of appeal in the shape of the
Privy Council', and 'the advantages of having one uniform Australian tribunal of final
resort outweighe[d] all feelings of localism'. 9 That the High Court was to have this
general appellate jurisdiction was not in question, and the main debates surrounding s
73 concerned proposals to sever Australian appeals to the Privy Council. 40 The
existence of that general appellate jurisdiction is an important national feature of
federalism that finds its place in Ch III.
E Summary
Federalism is a defining feature of Ch III at multiple levels: in the separate
identification of federal judicial power in relation to enumerated heads of federal
jurisdiction and in contrast to the continuation of state judicial power and jurisdiction;
in the recognition that federal and state courts are distinctive creatures of their
respective bodies politic; in the structural integration of the federal judicature to
include state courts when required by the federal Parliament to exercise federal
jurisdiction; and in the integration of the judicial system through a general appellate
jurisdiction.
IV PATTERNS OF CENTRALISATION
While Ch III was designed in a way to accommodate the competing federal
conceptions of the confederal and the national (that is, separateness/distinctiveness vs
aggregation/integration), the High Court has largely developed Ch III principles that
erode the distinctive features of state judicial systems. As will be seen, we have a
federal judicial system that is characterised by an expansion of federal judicial power, a
convergence of institutional design and uniformity of outcome across judicial systems.
A The allocation of power the expanded reach of federal judicial power
As mentioned, one of the defining features of the Australian federal judicial system is
that there are two sources of judicial power and jurisdiction: federal and state. Despite
the creation of Commonwealth judicial power, federal jurisdiction and a judicial
system through which that power and jurisdiction are exercised, state jurisdiction and
judicial power to be exercised by state courts retained a distinctive existence from the
federal judicial system created by Ch III. This section will show that there has been an
expansion of the jurisdictional opportunities for the exercise of Commonwealth
judicial power, by both federal and state courts, at the expense of state jurisdiction and
judicial power. The core platform for this centralisation of judicial power has been the
development of the concept of accrued jurisdiction.
38 See John M Bennett, Keystone of the Federal Arch (Australian Government Publishing
Service, 1980) 3-6.
39 John Quick and Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Constitution
(1901) 725.
40 See James Stellios, The Federal Judicature - Chapter III of the Constitution: Commentary and
Cases (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 9-33.
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1. Accrued jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction is created and identified in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution by
reference to the word 'matter'. Parliament's power to vest additional federal
jurisdiction in the High Court (s 76) and federal jurisdiction in lower federal courts (s
77(i)) and state courts (s 77(iii)) is conditioned by the existence of a 'matter'. In a series
of cases in the early 1980s, 41 the High Court laid the foundations for an increased
centralisation of judicial power by developing an expansive principle of 'accrued
jurisdiction'. The pivotal concept of 'matter' was read by the Court to refer to the
underlying 'justiciable controversy, identifiable independently of the proceedings
which are brought for its determination and encompassing all claims made within the
scope of the controversy', 42 whether federal or state-based. Furthermore, the Court
took a relaxed approach for determining whether federal and state claims form part of
the same 'matter': if they are non-severable, in the sense that they arise from the same
substratum of facts, then a court will hear the state claim in 'accrued' federal
jurisdiction.4 3
Thus, in short, where a federal claim and a state claim arise out of the same
substratum of facts, the state claim falls to be decided within the same 'matter' of
federal jurisdiction as the federal claim, and is determined with an exercise of
Commonwealth judicial power. While there has been much concern expressed about
the expansion of federal legislative powers in cases like Tasmanian Dam,44 there has
been little recognition that the High Court was, at the same time, expanding the
jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. The
expansion of these jurisdictional opportunities can be assessed through their impact,
respectively, on federal courts and state courts.
2. Accrued jurisdiction and federal courts
The key High Court decisions in the early 1980s focused on the exercise by lower
federal courts of jurisdiction over claims that otherwise would have been decided by a
state court exercising state jurisdiction (for convenience, referred to hereafter as 'state-
based claims'). The High Court had earlier dealt with questions of its own jurisdiction
to consider state-based claims associated with claims falling within its jurisdiction. For
example, in Hopper v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic), 45 proceedings were
instituted in the High Court challenging the validity of the Marketing of Primary
Products Act 1935 (Vic) on the basis that the relevant provisions levied an excise duty in
breach of s 90 of the Constitution. The matter arose under the Constitution (and/or
involved its interpretation) and, thus, the head of federal jurisdiction in s 76(i) of the
Constitution, conferred on the High Court by s 30(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), was
triggered. However, the plaintiff pressed a further claim that would not otherwise
have triggered federal jurisdiction if pursued on its own. The relevant state provisions
required a deduction from payments owing to egg producers under the pooling
scheme established by the legislation, and the plaintiff claimed that, properly
41 Phillips Morris Incorporated v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457; Fencott
v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570; Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 261.
42 Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 603 (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ).
4 See, eg, Re Wakim, Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 585 (Gummow and Hayne JJ);
Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 607-8.
4 (1983) 158 CLR 1.
45 (1939) 61 CLR 665.
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construed, the legislation did not authorise such deductions. This was a state-based
claim which would not otherwise have triggered federal jurisdiction. A majority of the
Court held that the Court had jurisdiction to fully determine the dispute of the parties,
including the non-constitutional claim. 4 6 The reasoning of the Court was not fully
explained, but the comments of Isaacs J in the earlier case of Pirrie v McFarlane4 7 seem
to provide the justification:
The word 'matter' in sec 76 does not, of course, mean simply the particular constitutional
question or other legal question which identifies the litigation with the section. ...
'Matter' means the whole controversy - the matter litigated. For instance, looking at sec
75, the 'matter' would not necessarily be simply that part of the controversy depending
on the construction or effect of a treaty, or that part of the controversy relating to a consul
or the Commonwealth. There might be other necessary parties and other essential
questions, all of which would be factors constituting the 'matter'. The controversy is not
intended to be decided piecemeal by different tribunals, State and Federal.
This accrued jurisdiction came into sharper contrast following the creation of the
Federal Court in 1976. In particular, the conferral of exclusive jurisdiction on the
Federal Court by the Trade Practices Act 1975 (Cth) in certain matters arising under that
Act raised the question of whether the Federal Court could hear related state-based
claims. For example, in Philip Morris Incorporated v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty
Ltd,48 the High Court considered whether the Federal Court could hear a claim for
relief for the common law tort of passing off along with the Trade Practices Act claims.
A majority of the Court considered that it could within its accrued jurisdiction: the
state claim fell within the 'matter' in relation to which the Federal Court had been
given jurisdiction (that is, a matter arising under a law made by Parliament - s 76(ii)).
The approach of Isaacs J from Pirrie finds resonance in the influential judgment of
Mason J in Philip Morris:49
the framers ... looked to 'matters' in the broadest sense of the term as one which would
catch up, as far as possible, the controversy which parties brought for determination by a
court. It is highly unlikely that they intended to embrace a narrow technical meaning
which would result in undue fragmentation of a total controversy, leaving its resolution
to decisions by both state courts and this Court or state courts and federal courts.
While cases on these jurisdictional issues subsided during the operational years of
the cross-vesting schemes, which vested state jurisdiction in federal courts and vice
versa, the invalidation of the conferral on federal courts of state jurisdiction in Re
Wakim; Ex parte McNally50 has given new life to the principles of accrued jurisdiction.
The consequence of these principles is that state-based claims which otherwise
would have been litigated in a state court exercising state jurisdiction and power, can
be litigated in a federal court if the state-based claims and federal claims are non-
severable. And, significantly, the High Court has adopted a liberal view of the
connection needed for a state-based claim and a federal claim to be non-severable.
Importantly for the purposes of this article, the federal court determines the state-
based claim with an exercise of federal judicial power.
46 See also Carter v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic) (1942) 66 CLR 557; Parton v Milk
Board (Vic) (1949) 80 CLR 229.
7 (1925) 36 CLR 170, 198 ('Pirrie').
48 (1981) 148 CLR 457.
49 Ibid 512-13.
50 (1999) 198 CLR 511 ('Re Wakim').
2014 365
Federal Law Review
3. Accrued jurisdiction and state courts
This centralising impact is even more pronounced in relation to state court jurisdiction.
The federal Parliament, with an exercise of power under s 77(iii), can confer federal
jurisdiction on state courts in relation to any of the 'matters' identified in ss 75 and 76.
With some exceptions, Parliament has conferred jurisdiction on state courts in relation
to all matters of federal jurisdiction that the High Court has.5 1
The federal jurisdiction conferred to determine these 'matters' includes the
authority to determine state-based claims that fall within the federal 'matter'. And,
significantly, the High Court has held that state judicial power has not survived the
vesting of state courts with federal jurisdiction in relation to matters set out in ss 75
and 76. The power in s 77(ii) of the Constitution (exercised through ss 38 and 39 of the
Judiciary Act) to define 'the extent to which the jurisdiction of any federal court shall be
exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in the courts of the States' has been
read by the Court to allow Parliament to strip state courts of state jurisdiction and
invest them with federal jurisdiction under s 77(iii) to resolve the same matters. 52
Even when the federal provisions did not operate on their face to oust state
jurisdiction in relation to a head of federal jurisdiction (for example, s 76(ii)), the
survival of that remaining state jurisdiction was held to be inconsistent with the
investiture of federal jurisdiction over that matter and, thus, had to give way. 53
Accordingly, the entire 'matter', comprising federal and state claims, is determined
with an exercise of federal jurisdiction and judicial power.
4. Other centralising principles for the operation of federal jurisdiction
There is a range of other principles developed by the High Court that have enhanced
the jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of federal jurisdiction. First, as the High
Court said in Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield,54 'federal jurisdiction may be attracted at
any stage of a legal proceeding'. Thus, depending on the head of federal jurisdiction in
question, federal jurisdiction may be triggered at the time proceedings are instituted,
when the defence is filed,55 when written or oral submissions are presented to a
court 56 or when the matter goes on appeal to an intermediate court. 57 Secondly, once
federal jurisdiction is triggered in good faith, it is not lost. This will be the case even if
the claim triggering federal jurisdiction is unsuccessful.5 8 Thirdly, whether federal
jurisdiction has been attracted is a matter of 'objective assessment': it is not 'a question
of establishing an intention to engage federal jurisdiction or an awareness that this has
occurred'. 59 Thus, the litigating parties cannot choose to opt out of federal jurisdiction
if it is otherwise engaged.
51 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39(2).
52 MZXOT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 233 CLR 601; Felton v Mulligan
(1971) 124 CLR 367.
53 Ibid.
54 (2005) 223 CLR 251, 262.
55 See, eg, Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367.
56 See, eg, John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503.
57 See, eg, Collins v Charles Marshall Pty Ltd (1955) 92 CLR 529.
58 See, eg, R v Carter, Ex parte Kisch (1934) 52 CLR 221, 224 (Evatt J); R v Bevan; Ex parte Elias &
Gordon (1942) 66 CLR 452, 466 (Starke J), 480 (Williams J).
59 Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2005) 223 CLR 251, 262-3.
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There is also a low jurisdictional threshold for triggering two of the important
heads of federal jurisdiction - ss 76(i) and (ii). In relation to federal matters under s
76(ii), the Court has held that a matter arises 'under any laws made by Parliament' 'if
the right or duty in question in the matter owes its existence to federal law or depends
upon federal law for its enforcement'. 60 Thus, in LNC Industries v BMW, the question
was whether the NSW Supreme Court was exercising federal jurisdiction when
considering a contractual dispute in circumstances where the subject matter of the
contract was an import licence granted under Commonwealth regulations. The
contract claim was a state-based claim, but the federal source of the contractual right
involved was enough to trigger federal jurisdiction under s 76(ii). Amplifying the
potential for s 76(ii) to be triggered is the expansive scope allowed to federal legislative
power. The wider the scope of legislative power to create rights and obligations
sourced in federal law, the greater the potential for disputes about those rights and
obligations under federal law to be resolved with an exercise of federal jurisdiction. In
turn, there is greater scope for state disputes to fall within accrued federal jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction in s 76(i) will be triggered 'in a case in which the giving of
judgment in favour of one of the parties depends upon the outcome of two or more
issues of which only one involves a constitutional question'. 61 This is so even if the
case is decided on another basis without resolving the constitutional issue.
Furthermore, the head of jurisdiction in s 76(i) will be triggered where 'the
interpretation of a provision of the Constitution is relevant to the determination of a
question of statutory interpretation', even in circumstances where the question of
statutory interpretation is the only issue in the case. 6 2 As long as the constitutional
interpretation is 'essential or relevant' to the statutory construction point, then federal
jurisdiction will be triggered. 63
5. Summary
This range of principles demonstrates the enhanced jurisdictional opportunities for an
exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. The principles have expanded the reach of
federal jurisdiction, both in federal and state courts. The expansion of federal
jurisdiction in this way has resulted in a greater centralisation of judicial power.
Furthermore, as will be explained in the next section, it has facilitated a convergence in
institutional design of federal and state courts, with an exercise of federal jurisdiction
being subjected to stringent separation of judicial power principles, whether in federal
or state courts. Moreover, it provides the Commonwealth Parliament with the
opportunity to control the exercise of that jurisdiction by choosing, under s 77(ii), to
vest federal jurisdiction, embracing any claims within accrued jurisdiction, exclusively
in federal courts. In Stack v Coast Securities (No 9),64 the High Court held that the
exclusive conferral of jurisdiction under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) did not, as a
matter of construction, extend to the accrued jurisdiction falling within the matter
concerned. However, presumably, Parliament might choose to do so if it so wanted.
60 R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett (1945) 70 CLR 141,
154 (Latham CJ), affirmed in LNC Industries v BMW(1983) 151 CLR 575, 581.
61 Attorney-General (NSW) v Commonwealth Savings Bank (1986) 160 CLR 315, 327.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid, quoting Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [No 4] (1953) 88 CLR 529, 541.
64 (1983) 154 CLR 261.
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B Convergence of institutional design
The second way in which there has been a centralisation of judicial power has been
through a convergence in institutional design. There were two distinctive institutional
features of state judicial systems at 1900. The first distinctive feature was that, unlike
the position at the federal level, there would be no entrenched division of power at the
state level and no constitutional rules about which institution would exercise which
power. The second distinctive feature was that the Privy Council would remain an
integral part of state judicial systems. This section will explore how each of these
distinctive features has diminished.
1. Converging constitutional constraints
Separation of judicial power principles
The High Court has developed stringent separation of judicial power principles at the
federal level. Commonwealth judicial power is to be exercised only by courts referred
to in s 71 of the Constitution (the Alexander principle), 65 and courts exercising
Commonwealth judicial power can only exercise judicial power or incidental non-
judicial power (the Boilermakers principle). 66 In developing these principles, the High
Court has relied heavily on the rule of interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius;
that is, Ch III exclusively sets out the repositories of Commonwealth judicial power
and is the exclusive source of power that can be exercised by courts exercising
Commonwealth judicial power.67 Consequently, the Alexander and Boilermakers
principles arise as negative implications from the text of the Constitution.
Importantly, these federal separation of judicial power principles apply as
limitations on the federal Parliament only. Reliance upon the textual distribution of
powers in the Constitution to ground the federal separation principles presents
difficulties for the application of such principles at the state level: the logic of the
argument deriving from Ch III can only apply to the federal arms of government.
Furthermore, state constitutions are generally not entrenched, and so it is difficult to
derive similar implications from any textual distribution of powers at the state level.
Thus, distinctive features of our federal system were that state government power
would not be constitutionally pigeon-holed into legislative, executive or judicial
categories, and there would be no fixed constitutional understanding of how state
power would be distributed across arms of government. Nevertheless, as will be
explained, principles have been developed which have expanded the reach of the
federal separation of judicial power principles, and have imposed limitations on what
powers can be given to, and perhaps taken from, state courts.
Federal courts exercise federal jurisdiction over state-based claims
As explained earlier, the High Court has developed accrued jurisdiction principles
which have enhanced the jurisdictional opportunities for federal courts to exercise
federal judicial power in relation to state-based claims that would otherwise have been
determined in a state court exercising state judicial power. The opportunities for the
exercise of accrued jurisdiction have been magnified by the broad approach to federal
heads of legislative power, expanding the matters that are within the reach of s 76(h) of
65 The Waterside Workers' Federation ofAustralia v JIWAlexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434.
66 R v Kirby, Ex parte Boilermakers' Society ofAustralia (1956) 94 CLR 254 ('Boilermakers').
67 See, eg, Boilermakers (1956) 94 CLR 254, 270.
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the Constitution. Importantly, because the jurisdiction of lower federal courts,
including its accrued jurisdiction, is federal jurisdiction conferred by the federal
Parliament, the lower federal court must exercise its jurisdiction and power within the
constraints of the federal separation of judicial power principles.
Separation of judicial power at the state level: when state courts exercise federal jurisdiction
As further explained earlier, the High Court has also developed principles which have
enhanced the jurisdictional opportunities for state courts to exercise Commonwealth
judicial power. Again, in itself, this has resulted in a centralisation of judicial power.
However, in addition to expanding the opportunities for an exercise of federal
jurisdiction in state courts, the High Court has developed a theory about how state
laws are applied by a state court when exercising federal jurisdiction. The Court
appears to have accepted the idea that state Parliaments lack the constitutional power
to prescribe what laws are to apply when a court - federal or state - is exercising
federal jurisdiction. As Gummow J said in APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner
(NSW):
the exclusivity of the powers of the Parliament with respect to the conferring, defining
and investing of federal jurisdiction (found in s 77 and supported by ss 78, 79 and 80) has
the consequence, well recognised in the authorities that the laws of a State with respect to
limitation of actions and other matters of substantive and procedural law which are
'picked up' by s 79 of the Judiciary Act, could not directly and of their own force operate
in the exercise of federal jurisdiction. This generally results from an absence of State
legislative power rather than the operation of s 109 of the Constitution with respect to the
exercise of concurrent powers. 68
On this theory, state laws cannot apply in federal jurisdiction of their own force,
and must be picked up and applied as surrogate federal law by a Commonwealth
provision.69 However, the consequence of this theory of how state laws apply in
federal jurisdiction is that the federal provisions, that pick up state provisions, must
comply with the federal separation of judicial power principles: if the Commonwealth
Parliament cannot confer non-judicial power on state courts because of the Boilermakers
principle, it cannot pick up state laws that confer powers of the same character. Thus,
the High Court has held that such provisions will not operate to pick up functions that
are 'insusceptible of exercise as part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth'. 70
This has been highli hted most dramatically by the High Court's decision in
Momcilovic v The Queen:7 a decision that has unsettled the operation of the 'dialogue'
model of rights protection in the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities
68 APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322, 406, citing Northern
Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 575, 628; Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins (2000)
202 CLR 629, 642; Solomons v District Court (NSW) (2002) 211 CLR 119, 134; referring also to
s 68 of the Judiciary Act and R v Gee (2003) 212 CLR 230, 255-6.
69 The primary - although not the only - vehicles for picking up state laws in federal
jurisdiction are ss 68(1) and 79(1) of the Judiciary Act. There may be some dispute about
Commonwealth power to regulate substantive rights and duties within federal jurisdiction,
but it is clear that powers used in the exercise of federal jurisdiction can be prescribed or
picked up by Commonwealth law: see Graeme Hill and Andrew Beech, "'Picking up" State
and Territory Laws under s 79 of the Judiciary Act - Three Questions' (2005) 27 Australian
Bar Review 25, 31-5.
70 Solomons v District Court (NSV) (2002) 211 CLR 119, 135.
71 (2011) 245 CLR 1.
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Act 2006 and the ACT Human Rights Act 2004. The power of the Victorian Supreme
Court to make a declaration of inconsistency was considered by five High Court judges
in Momcilovic to involve neither an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power nor
incidental non-judicial power and, accordingly, could not be picked up by s 79 of the
Judiciary Act where the Supreme Court was exercising federal jurisdiction.72
In summary, the expanded reach of Commonwealth judicial power into state
courts, along with the High Court's theory for how state laws are applied by state
courts exercising federal jurisdiction, have allowed an increased infiltration of federal
separation of judicial power principles to control and discipline the exercise of state
judicial power.
Separation of judicial power at the state level - Kable principles
Although the federal separation of judicial power principles do not apply to state
courts, one of the distinctive features of the Australian judicial system is that state
courts are deeply embedded within the federal judicature: they are authorised by
federal jurisdiction to exercise Commonwealth judicial power, and appeals are
guaranteed from state Supreme Courts to the High Court.73 These degrees of
integration within the federal judicial system have been seen by the High Court -
commencing with the decision in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) 74 - to
have consequences for what state Parliaments can do with their courts. Thus, although
state courts are creatures of the States, and were intended to retain a distinctive
identity within the federal system, they transcend their state-based status because of
their inclusion within the federal judicial system. Their role within that system has
been held to qualify their separateness and distinctiveness.
The development of these principles is well covered elsewhere7 5 and will not be
repeated in detail here. It is enough to say that state Parliaments are prevented from
conferring powers on state courts if their institutional integrity would be undermined.
Institutional integrity has been measured at least in part by independence, impartiality
and fairness.76 It may also be the case that state Parliaments will breach these
principles if they regulate in a way that is 'repugnant to the judicial process in a
fundamental degree'. 7 7 And, importantly, state provisions that breach these
72 The Chief Justice of the High Court indicated a preparedness to revisit the way in which
some state laws are applied in federal jurisdiction. However, there is no indication that
there is wider appetite on the Court to revise these principles. See Will Bateman and James
Stellios, 'Chapter III of the Constitution, Federal Jurisdiction and Dialogue Models of
Human Rights' (2012) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 36-9; Helen Irving, 'State
Jurisdictional Residue: What Remains to a State Court when its Chapter III Functions are
Exhausted?' (2014) 42 Federal Law Review 121.
73 Subject to valid exceptions and regulations.
7 (1996) 189 CLR 51 ('Kable').
75 See recently, eg, Gabrielle Appleby and John Williams, 'A New Coat of Paint: Law and
Order and the Refurbishment of Kable' (2012) 40 Federal Law Review 1; Lim, above n 20.
76 Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR
1; Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638; Pollentine v Bleijie
[2014] HCA 30.
77 International Finance Trust Co Ltd v NSW Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319, 367
(Gummow and Bell JJ), 385 (Heydon J): where NSW legislation prevented an affected party
from challenging the making of a court order, the High Court held that incompatibility
with Commonwealth judicial power arose. Although comments in Assistant Commissioner
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requirements are invalid: they do not operate to take the state body outside the concept
of a 'court' for Ch III purposes. A contrary conclusion, the High Court has held, 'would
... weaken the effectiveness of the distinctive feature of Australian federalism
represented by the general words of s 77(iii) of the Constitution.'7 8 In other words,
state Parliaments are forced to retain their existing courts and respect the constitutional
requirements.
More recently, Kable has been further developed in Kirk v Industrial Relations
Commission of New South Wales79 to protect certain judicial functions that were
characteristic of a state Supreme Court at 1900. If a power can be identified as
characteristic of a state court, then state Parliaments are prevented from divesting state
courts of that power. In Kirk, judicial review of government decision-making for
jurisdictional error was considered a characteristic function of state Supreme Courts
which could not be removed by the use of a privative clause. By so holding, the High
Court recalibrated the Kable principle to achieve at the state level what had been
achieved at the federal level by the High Court in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth.80
Thus, despite the inapplicability of the federal separation of judicial power
principles at the state level, and the absence of an entrenched separation in state
constitutions, the High Court has imposed Kable and Kirk limitations on state
Parliaments. The Kable principles can be seen as imposing a miniature form of the
Boilermakers principle on state Parliaments, and Kirk provides a platform for the High
Court to impose a miniature form of the Alexander principle on state Parliaments.
Accordingly, we see a convergence in institutional design.
This institutional design convergence has also been reflected in other developments
of the Kable principles. First, in Wainohu v New South Wales,81 the High Court aligned
the persona designata principles, that control the extent to which federal judges can
exercise powers in their personal capacity, 82 with an extension of the Kable principles
to state court judges acting in their personal capacity. Secondly, there have been
distinct tendencies in the Kable cases to reach conclusions on the application of Kable
principles by analogising to federal separation of judicial power cases. Of course, it has
been well accepted that a law that would survive the federal separation of powers
principles would also survive the Kable principles.8 3 However, there increasingly has
been a tendency in High Court decisions to draw from federal separation of judicial
power principles when reasoning to conclusions about the application of Kable
standards.8 4 Consequently, as Stephen McLeish SC has noted, 'the results of the
Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638 may suggest that this test has fallen out of
favour with a majority of the Court: [138], [169] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
78 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501, 544 (Gummow, Hayne,
Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
79 (2010) 239 CLR 531 ('Kirk').
80 (2003) 211 CLR 476.
81 (2011) 243 CLR 181.
82 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57; Wilson v Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1.
83 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513; Silbert v DPP (WA) (2004) 217 CLR 181; HA Bachrach
Pty Limited v Queensland (1998) 195 CLR 547.
84 International Finance Trust Co Ltd v NSW Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319, 352-6
(French CJ); South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 20, 50 (French CJ), 63-5 (Gummow J),
82-90 (Hayne J), 155-9 (Crennan and Bell JJ), 162-3, 170 (Kiefel J); Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243
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application of the Kable principle are beginning to converge with the results that might
be reached by applying a separation of powers approach'. 85
In summary, despite the inapplicability of the federal separation of power
principles to the States, and the absence of an entrenched separation at the state level,
the High Court has eroded this distinctiveness of state judicial systems.
2. The 'autochthonous expedient' as a further constraint
In addition to the constraining effects of the Kable principles, the investiture of federal
jurisdiction in state courts pursuant to s 77(iii) of the Constitution may well present
practical obstacles for experimentation with dispute settlement institutions at the state
level. Questions have arisen as to whether state non-judicial tribunals can exercise
judicial power in circumstances that would fall within a matter of federal jurisdiction
set out in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution.
For example, in Commonwealth v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (Tasmania),86 a
question arose whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Tribunal could make
binding orders against the Commonwealth for breaches of the Anti-Discrimination Act
1988 (Tas). Such a claim would be heard in federal jurisdiction (having its source in s
75(iii)) if it were determined by a state court (state courts having been authorised to
determine such matters by s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act). Kenny J of the Federal Court
considered that the Tasmanian tribunal was not a 'court' that could resolve such a
dispute with an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power and, thus, could not
determine the claim against the Commonwealth.8 7
Of course, questions have already arisen, and will continue to arise, as to whether a
tribunal is a 'court' for Ch III purposes. However, this line of cases suggests that the
States may well face practical constraints when designing their dispute settlement
systems in ways that shift judicial power from courts to bodies that do not satisfy the
constitutional description of a 'court'.
3. Increased federal control over procedure and process
In addition to these convergences in the constitutional constraints applicable to federal
and state courts, there has also been increased potential for federal control over judicial
procedures and processes. The expanded opportunities for the exercise of federal
accrued jurisdiction - both in federal and state courts - have enabled greater control
CLR 506, 551 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Momcilovic v The
Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 95 (Gummow J, with Hayne J agreeing), 185 (Heydon J). Although,
the High Court has more recently emphasised the importance of keeping the principles
separate: Pompano (2013) 295 ALR 638, [125] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Pollentine
v Bleijie [2014] HCA 30, [42].
85 McLeish, above n 19, 255 (emphasis in original).
86 (2008) 169 FCR 85.
87 The other members of the Full Court did not consider the question. Cf the contrary
conclusion of Heerey J in Commonwealth v Wood (2006) 148 FCR 276. Similar issues have
been considered with differing outcomes in Owen v Menzies [2013] 2 Qd R 327 and Sunol v
Collier (2012) NSWLR 619. On these issues, see David Rowe, 'State Tribunals within and
without the Integrated Federal Judicial System' (2014) 25 Public Law Review 48; Geoffrey
Kennett, 'Fault Lines in the Autochthonous Expedient: The Problem of State Tribunals'
(2009) 20 Public Law Review 152.
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by the federal Parliament of the procedures and processes through which the disputes
(otherwise state, but now federal) are determined.
This is most obvious in the case of federal courts where the Commonwealth
Parliament has exclusive control of the constitution and organisation of federal courts
and their procedures and processes. But even in the case of state courts exercising
federal jurisdiction, the Commonwealth Parliament exerts, or has the potential to exert,
substantial control over the exercise of that jurisdiction. Although the Parliament 'must
take the State court as it finds it',88 and is bound to accept 'the constitution of the
Court' and the 'organisation through which its jurisdiction and powers are
exercised', 89 Parliament can regulate the practice and procedure to be followed, and
the rules of evidence to be applied, when the state court is exercising federal
jurisdiction. The Commonwealth Parliament also can prescribe the number of judges
who can hear a federal matter, 90 and the class of state court officers who can exercise
federal jurisdiction.91 The Commonwealth Parliament has generally provided for the
picking-up of state rules of practice, procedure and evidence to matters of federal
jurisdiction when heard in state courts. 92 However, its power to apply different rules is
undoubted, leading to an increase in Commonwealth power over state courts.
4. Appellate pathways - the Privy Council and state judicial systems
It is well known that the respective place of the High Court and the Privy Council at
the apex of the Australian judicial systems was deeply controversial. While the driving
forces behind the federal movement sought to create the High Court as the ultimate
court of appeal from all Australian courts, this proposal encountered resistance from
the Imperial government, convention delegates, state Supreme Court judges and lobby
groups, all favouring a retention of Privy Council appeals, particularly from state
courts. 93
Compromises had already been made by the time the Australian delegates
presented their draft constitution to the Imperial government in 1900 for enactment by
the Imperial Parliament. In the proposal presented to the Imperial government, the
High Court was intended to have the final word on constitutional questions (other
than those raising imperial interests). Although appeals could go to the Privy Council
from state courts, appeals on constitutional questions were to go to the High Court.
Furthermore, although appeals could be taken from the High Court to the Privy
Council if Her Majesty in Council granted special leave, Parliament was given the
power to limit 'the matters in which such leave may be asked'. 94
The response of the Imperial government to the Australian proposal is well
known,95 and s 74 of the Constitution was amended before its enactment to preserve a
greater role for the Privy Council. With appropriate leave, appeals could be taken from
88 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 75.
89 Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481, 404.
90 Commonwealth Constitution s 78.
91 See, eg, Troy v Wrigglesworth (1919) 26 CLR 305, where federal jurisdiction was required to
be exercised by a police magistrate, not justices of the peace.
92 See especially ss 68(1) and 79(1) of the Judiciary Act.
93 See Stellios, above n 40, ch 1.
94 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Melbourne, 1898, 2536.
95 La Nauze, above n 36, ch 16; Williams, above n 30, 1160-8.
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the High Court and state courts to the Privy Council, although Parliament could 'make
laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked ...' from High Court
appeals. As far as constitutional cases were concerned, the High Court could only
control appeals raising questions 'as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers
of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se of the
Constitutional Powers of any two or more States'. Such appeals could only go to the
Privy Council if the High Court granted a certificate.
Thus, at federation, the Privy Council continued to play an important role in the
Australian judicial systems - federal and state. This was particularly the case in
relation to state court appeals, with litigants given the option of choosing the Privy
Council as the ultimate court of appeal in all cases - whether exercising state
jurisdiction or federal jurisdiction (including those involving constitutional questions).
However, embedded within the provisions of Ch III was the power of the federal
Parliament to make matters triggering federal jurisdiction exclusive to federal courts.
Pursuant to ss 77(ii) and (iii), Parliament could make matters of federal jurisdiction
exclusive to federal courts, thereby removing the opportunities for appeals to be taken
to the Privy Council from state courts. This design was not accidental: the historical
record shows that this was part of the compromise to resolve the deeply divisive issue
of Privy Council appeals. 96
Despite this constitutional design, Parliament instead vested federal jurisdiction in
state courts, but required any appeals in federal jurisdiction to be taken to the High
Court. This attempt to limit the role of the Privy Council in state court federal
jurisdiction cases resulted in a series of state court, High Court and Privy Council
decisions tussling for the control of federal jurisdiction. 97 There is no need to cover that
territory again here. It is enough to say that, while state courts and the Privy Council
resisted the Parliament's attempts to channel federal jurisdiction appeals to the High
Court, the High Court resolutely upheld the validity of Parliament's attempts to limit
Privy Council appeals from state courts exercising federal jurisdiction. 98
Thus, rather than forcing Parliament to utilise lower federal courts for the exercise
of federal jurisdiction as contemplated by the constitutional scheme, the High Court
instead endorsed Parliament's attempt to limit the role of the Privy Council as the
ultimate court of appeal from state courts when exercising federal jurisdiction, thereby
eroding the distinctive institutional design of state court systems.
C Uniformity of outcome
The discussion so far has shown how High Court decisions have expanded the
jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power and
resulted in a convergence in institutional design of federal and state courts and a
centralisation of power over judicial procedure and processes. In those respects, the
national features of Ch III have been amplified and the confederal features (ie, state
distinctiveness) have diminished. This centralising pattern can also be seen in the
increased uniformity in the legal rules applied in federal and state courts. This can be
seen in three ways.
96 La Nauze, above n 36, 267-8, 304.
97 See Stellios, above n 40, 34-47.
98 See Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087.
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1. One common law
First, largely because of the place of the High Court at the apex of the integrated
judicial hierarchy, it has been accepted that there is one common law throughout
Australia. Thus, within our federal system, there is no possibility for divergent
common law rules across federal and state courts. This was explained by Gaudron,
Gummow and Hayne JJ in Lipohar v The Queen 99 as a necessary consequence of the
doctrine of precedent and the place of the High Court at the apex of the Constitution
under s 73 of the Constitution:
Whatever may once have been the case in England the doctrine of precedent is now
central to any understanding of the common law in Australia. To assert that there is more
than one common law in Australia or that there is a common law of individual States is
to ignore the central place which precedent has in both understanding the common law
and explaining its basis. This Court is placed by s 73 of the Constitution at the apex of a
judicial hierarchy to give decisions upon the common law which are binding on all
courts, federal, State and territorial. 100
In his influential work on the common law foundations of the Constitution,101 Sir
Owen Dixon had advanced the view that '[w]e act every day on the unexpressed
assumption that the one common law surrounds us and applies where it has not been
superseded by statute'. 1 02 For Sir Owen, this was a point of distinction between
federalism in the United States and federalism in Australia. Federalism, American-
style, treats the common law as emanating from the separate sovereign status of the
States, whereas the federal system in Australia was born into a unitary common law.
The duty of all courts in Australia, Sir Owen said, was to recognise the common law as
'one system which should receive a uniform interpretation and application, not only
throughout Australia but in every jurisdiction of the British Commonwealth where the
common law runs'. 103 The anterior operation of the common law in Australia made it
'possible for an Australian to regard his country as governed by a single legal system
... composed of the common law, modified by the enactments of various
legislatures'. 104 It was, in his view, an 'instinctive faith in the unity of the system and
in the consequent need of uniform interpretations' that saw the establishment of the
High Court as a general court of appeal.1 0 5 Indeed, with this commitment to a unitary
system of law, Sir Owen considered that the framers were misplaced in adopting 'the
American distinction between State and Federal jurisdiction'. Instead, a judicial system
might have been created, 'which was neither State nor Federal but simply Australian',
99 (1999) 200 CLR 485, 505.
100 Ibid (footnotes omitted). Gleeson CJ (at 24) and Kirby J (at 552) agreed that there is one
common law in Australia. See also John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 518;
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 562-6.
101 See 'Address by the Hon Sir Owen Dixon, KCMG to the Section of the American Bar
Association for International and Comparative Law' (1943) 17 Australian Law Journal 138
and 'The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation' (1957) 31 Australian Law
Journal 240.
102 Dixon, 'Address by the Hon Sir Owen Dixon, KCMG to the Section of the American Bar
Association for International and Comparative Law', above n 101, 241.
103 Dixon, 'The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation', above n 101, 139.
104 Ibid 140.
105 Ibid.
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to administer the totality of the law.1 06 These views were referred to with approval in
High Courtjudgments establishing the proposition that there is one common law in
Australia. 107
It is not the purpose of this article to challenge or critique this view. As Professor
Zines has said, 'the evidence by and large shows that at the time of federation the
common law was conceived as a single body of law'.10 8 Instead, the purpose of this
article is simply to note that it was not the only view that was taken at the time of
federation or which has been taken since. Andrew Inglis Clark, one of the
Constitution's chief architects, was of the view that the common law would be part of
the law of each State. 109 In a paper written in 1995, Justice L Priestley expressed a
similar view: 'There is no reason why variant judicial decisions on common law rules
may not occur in different States and thus create divergences in the common law of the
States.' 110
The comments of both Inglis Clark and Justice Priestley were relied upon by
Callinan J in Lipohar when rejecting the majority's conclusion that there is one common
law:
This nation remains a federal nation. Power, legislative, executive and judicial is divided
among federal, State and Territory parliaments. ... It is not an opinion universally held in
this country that power and authority should inexorably accrue in all, or indeed, most
matters to the central organs of government. 111
For Callinan J, each State should have its own common law rules, otherwise 'the
autonomy' of the States would 'be eroded'. 112 Although the High Court, as the
ultimate court of appeal, would naturally have a harmonising effect on state common
law rules, 'in the meantime, the common law applied in the States [would] be that ...
stated to be the law by the respective Courts of Appeal and Full Courts'. 113
There is merit in this alternative view. Sir Owen's conception was based, in large
part, on the unified common law throughout the Commonwealth. But, by the late
1960s, the Privy Council had accepted that the common law might develop divergently
in different parts of the Commonwealth. 114 If it can fracture in this way, there is merit
in the view that it can fracture even further within a federal judicial system. However,
the point for present purposes is that the acceptance of one common law for Australia,
determined by the High Court, further facilitates the centralisation of judicial power.
106 Ibid.
107 For a review of this influence, see Leslie Zines, 'The Common Law in Australia: Its Nature
and Constitutional Significance', (Law and Policy Paper No 13, Centre for International and
Public Law, 1999), reprinted in (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 337.
108 Ibid 5.
109 Andrew Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (1901) 192.
110 U Priestley, 'A Federal Common Law in Australia?' (1995) 6 Public Law Review 221, 232.
The same view was expressed by Anstey Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in
Australia (Lawbook, 5th ed, 1976) 58-60.
111 (1999) 200 CLR 485, 576.
112 Ibid 583.
113 Ibid 582.
114 See Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221, 238.
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2. Rules of precedent
The second way in which uniformity of outcome has been achieved is through the
adoption of rules of precedent that minimise diversity of common law rules arising
across lower courts prior to the High Court's final determination of those rules. This
was made clear by five members of the High Court in Farah Constructions Pty Limited v
Say-Dee Pty Limited:115
Intermediate appellate courts and trial judges in Australia should not depart from
decisions in intermediate appellate courts in another jurisdiction on the interpretation of
Commonwealth legislation or uniform national legislation unless they are convinced that
the interpretation is plainly wrong. Since there is a common law of Australia rather than
each Australian jurisdiction, the same principle applies in relation to non-statutory law.
3. Choice of law rules
The third way in which uniformity of outcome across Australian courts has been
achieved is through the adoption of choice of law rules that are designed to achieve
uniformity. Thus, for example, the lex loci delicti has been favoured as the choice of law
rule to decide intra-national tort cases. 116 In deciding upon the lex loci delicti in John
Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson, the High Court took account of the following Ch III features:
'the existence and scope of federal jurisdiction, including the investment of State courts
with federal jurisdiction pursuant to s 77(iii) of the Constitution' and the position of the
High Court 'as the ultimate court of appeal, not only in respect of decisions made in
the exercise of federal jurisdiction'. 117
The decision in Pfeiffer resolved the division in the Court, that had appeared in
earlier cases, about the nature of the federal legal system. Some judges viewed the legal
system as a unitary one, while others viewed the federal system as a collection of
legally independent States. This division reflected the familiar federal tension between
the pursuit of uniform outcomes across state courts, and the preservation of the
capacity of States to prescribe diverging legal standards to be applied in forum courts.
Prior to Pfeiffer, the view favoured by a majority in McKain v R WMiller & Company
(SA) Pty LP and Stevens v Head119 was the mutual legal independence of the States.
To preserve the capacity of States to determine the law to be applied in state courts, the
majority in those cases adopted the double actionability rule as the appropriate choice
of law rule. The Court in Pfeiffer, however, rejected that position, and in doing so
favoured a unitary understanding of the federal legal system. The Court pointed to the
integrating features of Ch III that privileged uniformity of outcome and, for the Court,
required the application of the lex loci delicti.120
115 (2007) 230 CLR 89, 151-2.
116 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503 ('Pfeiffer').
117 Ibid 535.
118 (1991) 174 CLR 1.
119 (1993) 176 CLR 433.
120 Where a court is exercising federal jurisdiction, state laws must be picked up and applied
by federal provisions - notably ss 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act. The uniformity in
outcome was achieved by turning first to s 80 to pick up choice of law rules, and then to s
79 only if necessary (See Blunden v Commonwealth (2003) 218 CLR 330, 338-9; Pfeiffer (2000)
203 CLR 503, 529-32). The High Court's choice to sequence the application of ss 79 and 80
in this way was of great significance. A reversal of the order of ss 79 and 80, as favoured by
Brennan CJ in Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, 492-3, would have resulted in
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Of course, the lex loci delicti rule only picks up the substantive law of the place of
tort. Forum procedural laws continue to be applied by state courts. However the High
Court has considerably narrowed the potential for real divergences in substantive
outcomes across state courts by adopting a wide view of which laws are substantive in
character. A law will be substantive if it affects 'the existence, extent or enforceability
of the rights or duties of the parties'. 121 Thus, statutes of limitation and legislative caps
on damages, considered prior to Pfeiffer to be procedural in nature, are now considered
to be substantive. Consequently, the potential for divergent outcomes is considerably
reduced.
D Summary
One aspect of the centralisation of judicial power in Australia has been the uniformity
of outcomes that has been achieved across Australian courts. This uniformity has been
achieved by the High Court's acceptance of a single system of common law rules
applicable in Australia, the adoption of rules of precedent that smoulder diversity of
common law rules across lower courts, and the development of choice of law rules that
result in uniform outcomes across Australian courts. Along with the expansion in
jurisdictional opportunities for the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power and the
convergence in institutional design of Australian courts, the achievement of uniform
outcomes further demonstrates the increased centralisation of judicial power in the
Australian judicial system. On the whole, the national features of Ch III have been
promoted and enhanced, and the confederal have diminished.
E Traffic going the other way
It should be acknowledged that the High Court has recognised the distinctiveness of
state courts in some contexts: three of which should be emphasised. First, as already
mentioned, the Commonwealth must take a state court 'as it finds' it. As Gummow,
Hayne and Crennan JJ said in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments
Commission:122 '[t]he provisions of Ch III do not give power to the federal Parliament
to affect or alter the constitution or organisation of State courts.' Thus, although the
Commonwealth Parliament may vest federal jurisdiction in state courts and, to that
end, define the scope of that jurisdiction and regulate the procedure and rules of
evidence to be applied when the jurisdiction is exercised,123 it cannot regulate the
constitution or organisation of state courts. 124
However, this recognition represents no more than a minimum core of
constitutional protection for state courts against an unbridled application of the
reasoning in the Engineers Case.1 25 It is a minimum core that aligns with the conception
of the state immunity doctrine developed by Dixon J in Melbourne Corporation v
Commonwealth.1 26 This is well demonstrated by the differing positions adopted by
forum favouritism and a lack of uniform outcomes. For a more detailed analysis of these
issues, see James Stellios, 'Choice of Law and the Australian Constitution: Locating the
Debate' (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 7.
121 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 543.
122 (2006) 228 CLR 45, 75.
123 See, eg, Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495.
124 See, eg, Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481.
125 (1920) 28 CLR 129.
126 (1947) 74 CLR 31.
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Isaacs J and Dixon J in Le Mesurier v Connor:127 a case concerning Commonwealth
attempts to appoint a federal officer as the Bankruptcy Registrar of the Supreme Court
of Western Australia when exercising federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. A narrow
majority of the Court (Knox CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ; Isaacs and Starke JJ dissenting) held
the Commonwealth provisions to be invalid for altering the constitution of the Court.
By contrast, Isaacs J concluded that the majority's view was inconsistent with the
'occasionally forgotten' Engineers Case.128 The position was well put by Brendan Lim in
the following way:
State judicial institutions are understood to be components of the states in their
constitutional conception, at least in the sense that a state's capacity to function as a
government is understood to include the capacity to organise 'its own' courts and 'its
own' judges. 129
Secondly, the High Court held in Re Wakim 130 that state judicial power cannot be
conferred on federal courts. While Ch III allows the federal Parliament to confer
federal jurisdiction on state courts to exercise Commonwealth judicial power, there is
no constitutional facility for state Parliaments to confer state jurisdiction on federal
courts. Nor is there a constitutional facility for the federal Parliament to consent to
such a conferral. It is now well known that, in Re Wakim, the High Court held that the
express provision of Commonwealth power to invest state courts with federal
jurisdiction gave rise to a negative implication that the reverse was not constitutionally
permissible.
At first glance, the decision appears to quarantine state jurisdiction for exercise by
state courts, thereby protecting and preserving the distinctiveness of state judicial
power. However, in areas where there are political priorities for uniform schemes, the
consequence of Re Wakim is to further enhance the potential for the replacement of
state jurisdiction with federal jurisdiction. The circumstances considered in Re Wakim
provide the perfect illustration. Uniformity in corporate regulation in Australia has
been a long-standing political objective. Prior to Re Wakim, this uniformity was
achieved by a co-operative arrangement across federal and state jurisdictions. Using its
territories power in s 122 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth enacted a
Corporations Law for the Australian Capital Territory. The text of that Corporations
Law was then picked up by legislation in each State. The disputes that arose under
those state Acts were disputes arising under state laws and usually1 3 1 determined with
an exercise of state judicial power.
Central to this co-operative Corporations Law scheme was the cross-vesting of
jurisdiction: the vesting of federal jurisdiction in state courts and the vesting of state
jurisdiction in federal courts. The cross-vesting of jurisdiction was designed to ensure
that Corporations Law disputes were determined by the court in question without
complicated jurisdictional issues arising.
127 (1929) 42 CLR 481.
128 Ibid 512.
129 Lim, above n 20, 36, citing the state immunity case of Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215
CLR 185.
130 (1999) 198 CLR 511.
131 Leaving aside instances where federal jurisdiction was attracted in some way other than s
76(ii) of the Constitution.
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The consequence of the decision in Re Wakim was the referral of legislative power
by the States to the Commonwealth Parliament for the enactment of a uniform
corporations law in reliance on the referral power in s 51(xxxvii). This was achieved
with the enactment of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Importantly, for present
purposes, the disputes that arise under the Corporations Act give rise to matters of
federal jurisdiction (embracing any state claims within accrued jurisdiction) under s
76(ii) of the Constitution and are determined by courts - whether federal or state -
with an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. The disputes that were, prior to Re
Wakim, determined in state jurisdiction, are now determined in federal jurisdiction
according to the disciplines imposed by the federal separation of judicial power
principles, and the procedures and processes through which the disputes are resolved
are now subject to federal control.
Thirdly, in deciding whether non-judicial officers of state courts could exercise the
judicial power of the Commonwealth when vested in the relevant state court, the High
Court initially took an approach protective of Commonwealth judicial power. The state
'court' that could exercise Commonwealth judicial power was said to be composed of
judicial officers, and only judicial officers could exercise that power. 132
However, in Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund,133 the High Court rejected
this earlier approach, instead preferring the dissenting view of Gibbs J in Kotsis that the
expression state 'courts' is 'meant to refer to State courts with the organization and
structure provided by State law', including non-judicial officers.1  In explaining the
adoption of the new approach, Mason J referred to the 'great inconvenience to the
States and their courts if the structure and composition of a State court for the exercise
of federal jurisdiction is to differ from that selected by the State for the exercise of its
similar non-federal jurisdiction'. 135 Requiring state courts to be structured to satisfy
federal separation of judicial power principles when exercising federal jurisdiction
would place considerable pressure on state Parliaments to design state courts in the
image of federal courts. This, for Mason J, would 'constrain the States' freedom of
action in the organization of their courts'. 13 6
Nevertheless, even here, there is convergence with the design of federal courts. In
Harris v Caladine,137 the Mason Court held that non-judicial officers of federal courts
could exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and in supporting that view, a
majority of the Court drew support from the Hospital Contribution Fund case allowing
non-judicial officers of state courts to exercise Commonwealth judicial power. 138 Thus,
the lack of symmetry in the principles led to the ratcheting down of federal principles
to achieve convergence.
In summary, although the High Court, in some respects, has been protective of the
distinctiveness of state judicial power and state courts, those occasions are relatively
few and their impact cannot to be overstated.
132 Kotsis v Kotsis (1970) 122 CLR 69; Knight v Knight (1971) 122 CLR 114.
133 (1982) 150 CLR 49 ('Hospital Contribution Fund').
134 Kotsis v Kotsis (1970) 122 CLR 69, 110.
135 (1982) 150 CLR 49, 62.
136 Ibid.
137 (1991) 172 CLR 84.
138 Ibid 93 (Mason CJ and Deane J), 122 (Dawson J), 151 (Gaudron J). While generally
supportive of the majority view, McHugh J disapproved of the analogy (at 157).
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V REASONS FOR THE CENTRALISING TRENDS
The article so far has sought to identify the centralising trends within the Australian
judicial system. This has been a descriptive account of the complexion of judicial
federalism in Australia. It is an account that largely tracks the centralising trends
documented in other areas of Australian federalism, particularly legislative and fiscal
federalism.
This final part of the article seeks to identify reasons for the centralising trends. The
article does not seek to assess whether Australian judicial federalism has taken an ideal
form: that is a much larger question. The purpose of this section is more modest: to
identify the explanations apparent from the cases for these centralising trends. This
section will offer three explanations: first, the centralising force of nation-building;
secondly, rule of law concerns for litigants arising from multiple legal systems within a
federal system; and, thirdly, the desire to give the federal Parliament a real and
effective choice between federal and state courts for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
A Nation-building
As highlighted earlier, an expansion of federal jurisdiction has provided the platform
for a centralisation of judicial power. The early cases exhibiting a preference for
expansive federal jurisdictional principles were decided against the background of the
delicate relationship between the High Court and the Privy Council discussed earlier.
In what is, perhaps, the first indication of an expansive jurisdictional principle,
Isaacs J said in Pirrie that 'matter' should be read broadly to allow resolution of the
whole dispute between the parties. This statement was made in the course of
considering the validity of ss 38A, 40A and 41 of the Judiciary Act, which had been
enacted in response to the congestion of state court, Privy Council and High Court
decisions on the question of whether Parliament could prevent appeals going to the
Privy Council from state courts exercising federal jurisdiction. Following a tense
exchange of judicial opinion, in 1907 Parliament enacted those provisions to require
inter se questions in state courts to be transferred to the High Court. Of course, for this
mechanism to work, it was important to know when an inter se question was raised in
a state court. Having set out the paragraph quoted earlier, Isaacs J concluded: 'If, then,
the "matter" is once identified as falling under one or other of the specified heads, it is
part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and may be dealt with as the
Commonwealth Parliament has dealt with such matters in the sections under
review'. 139
The early approach for determining whether an inter se question had arisen before a
court for the purposes of s 40A of the Judiciary Act was a narrow one. For s 40A to
operate, the inter se question did not 'arise' unless its determination was necessary in
order to dispose of the case. 14 0 Similarly, in the earlier decisions of the High Court, a
matter did not involve the interpretation of the Constitution under s 76(i) unless the
matter presented 'necessarily and directly and not incidentally an issue upon its
interpretation'.14 1 These narrower approaches, however, eventually 'gave way' 142 to
139 (1925) 36 CLR 170, 198.
140 R v Maryborough Licensing Court, Ex parte Webster & Co Ltd (1919) 27 CLR 249.
141 James v South Australia (1927) 40 CLR 1, 40.
142 Attorney-General (NSV) v Commonwealth Savings Bank (1986) 160 CLR 315, 326.
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broader views. Thus, an inter se question was later considered to arise as soon as it
appeared that the case 'can be resolved by deciding that question, even if it might
ultimately prove possible, by answering other questions, to dispose of the case without
determining the inter se question itself'.14 3 As Kitto J recognised in Lansell v Lansell, the
purpose of s 40A supplemented the operation of s 74 of the Constitution:
The evident purpose of s 40A, after all, is to supplement the provision made by s 74 of the
Constitution in furtherance of the 'high policy' of reserving 'for the jurisdiction of (the)
High Court the solution of those inter se questions which were of such vital importance to
Commonwealth and States alike'. I take it to be the purpose of s 40A to prevent the
Supreme Court of a State from pronouncing a judgment (which may be carried by direct
appeal to the Privy Council) in any cause in which it has become apparent that s 74 of the
Constitution would have precluded an appeal to the Privy Council in the absence of a
certificate if the court had been the High Court. Unless the view above suggested as to
when an inter se question arises is correct, this purpose must largely fail. 144
These expansive inter se principles were used by Stephen, Mason, Aickin and
Wilson JJ in Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Pty Ltd14 5 to support a broad view
of federal jurisdiction which would prevent, according to s 39(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act,
an appeal to the Privy Council. Their Honours considered that, once federal
jurisdiction is triggered, it is 'not lost by subsequent disclaimer or by the primary
judge's failure to decide the matter'. 146 In supporting their broad view of the federal
jurisdictional point, their Honours looked to the 'analogy' 147 of inter se cases.
The operation of s 39(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act was also the context for the Court's
decision in LNC Industries v BMW 14 8 to take a broad view of when a matter arises
under a federal law for the purposes of s 76(ii). Similarly, in Felton v Mulligan,149 where
the Court held that state jurisdiction is displaced in circumstances where it has been
given federal jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, the question was whether s 39(2)(a)
prevented an appeal to the Privy Council.
The rationale underlying the inter se cases was also relied on by the Court in
Attorney-General (NSW) v Commonwealth Savings Bank15 0 to support a more expansive
view of when a matter arises under s 76(i) of the Constitution. Consequently, as
already noted, the Court considered that a matter arose under s 76(i) even though the
case was disposed of without the constitutional issue being determined or where the
constitutional question was relevant to a question of statutory construction. The issue
in Attorney-General (NSW) v Commonwealth Savings Bank was not whether an appeal to
the Privy Council should be prevented by s 39(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act. Rather, the
question was whether a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its
interpretation could be removed to the High Court under s 40 of the Judiciary Act.
Nonetheless, the Court relied upon the same rationale that was put forward to justify
curtailing Privy Council appeals.
143 Ibid 327, referring to Lansell v Lansell (1964) 110 CLR 353, 357-9; Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v
Philip Morris (1980) 145 CLR 457, 476-7.
144 Lansell v Lansell (1964) 110 CLR 353, 358.
145 (1980) 145 CLR 457.
146 Ibid 477.
147 Ibid 476.
148 (1983) 151 CLR 575.
149 (1971) 124 CLR 367.
150 (1986) 160 CLR 315, 327.
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The elevation of the High Court to the apex of Australian judicial systems has, in
fact, taken on a centralising life of its own. There is one common law of Australia, and
the position of the High Court 'as the final appellate court for the country, is the means
by which that unity in the common law is ensured'. 15 1 However, as Stephen McLeish
SC has noted, even 'when the Privy Council sat at the apex of a judicial hierarchy for
all British colonies, it did so notwithstanding that the same common law did not apply
across the Empire'. 152 Ironically, within a decade or so of asserting its authority to
deviate from English common law, the High Court denied the possibility of the
common law further fracturing into separate state common law systems.
Additionally, in Mellifont v Attorney-General (Qld), 15 3 the High Court relaxed the
approach for determining what judgments could be appealed to the High Court under
s 73 from state courts, so as to facilitate the role of the High Court at the apex of the
judicial system. Prior to Mellifont, a state Supreme Court judgment could only be
appealed to the High Court if it 'finally determined the rights of the parties.' 154 This
approach had significant consequences for well-established provisions for lower courts
to refer questions of law or state a case to a state Supreme Court. Because the answers
to the questions would not, themselves, resolve the dispute between the parties, the
Supreme Court's answers could not be taken on appeal to the High Court under s 73.
The consequence that limited approach had for the role of the High Court 'as the final
appellate court of the nation' 15 prompted the Court in Mellifont to broaden the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. What may have been an opportunity to allow for a distinctive
voice at the state Supreme Court level, was removed by an expansion of the High
Court's appellate jurisdiction.
In summary, nation-building can be said to be the earliest explanation for an
expansion in federal jurisdiction. The desire to minimise the role of the Privy Council
in relation to inter se questions filtered through to an expansive view of when federal
jurisdiction is triggered, with the consequence that s 39(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act had a
broader field of operation to prevent appeals to the Privy Council in matters of federal
jurisdiction. This underlying rationale was not always made explicit in High Court
judgments, and seemed to have been transferred from the context of Privy Council
appeals to High Court removals. Nonetheless, it is clear that the minimisation of the
role of the Privy Council provides a clear explanation for the early development of an
expanding field of federal jurisdiction. And, the elevation of the High Court to the
apex of Australian judicial systems has, itself, had an important centralising effect.
B Rule of law
Dixon J famously said that the rule of law is an assumption upon which the
Constitution rests. 156 It is not entirely clear what that means as a general proposition.
151 Re Wakim (1999) 198 CLR 511, 574 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
152 McLeish, above n 19, 263.
153 (1991) 173 CLR 289 ('Mellifont').
154 Swiss Aluminium Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 163 CLR 421, 425
(Mason C, Wilson, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
155 O'Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232, 268 (Brennan J); see also at 283-4
(Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
156 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193.
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However, in the context of Ch III,157 the High Court has sought to give effect to it in a
number of ways. First, and perhaps most obviously, the High Court has subjected the
exercise of judicial power to separation of power disciplines and the rule of law ideas
that underpin them. Separation of judicial power principles have been explained in a
number of ways: all of which draw from the desire to have an independent and
impartial judiciary. The expansion of jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of
Commonwealth judicial power along with the rules about how state laws apply in
federal jurisdiction, operate in tandem to maximise the impact of the separation of
judicial power disciplines. Even beyond the reach of federal jurisdiction, Kable has
imposed these core rule of law values on state courts. Emerging Kirk principles may
operate to isolate traditional judicial functions within state judicial systems that are
subject to such disciplines.
The cases also exhibit other rule of law principles. As has been developed, one of
the perennial tensions to be accommodated within a federal system is between the
national and the confederal. One of the well-accepted benefits of a centralised federal
system is that of uniform outcomes irrespective of locality. This is often presented as
an efficiency argument, but it is also commonly presented as one that has benefits for
the individual. In the context of judicial systems, the argument manifests itself as rule
of law objectives of efficiency in the administration of justice and uniform outcomes
irrespective of state of residence.
There is a clear flavour of this kind of rule of law argument across many of the
areas outlined earlier in the article and, indeed, sometimes a recognition that the rule
of law objectives must be weighed against the distinctiveness of state judicial systems.
A useful starting point is the early justification put forward for an expansive reading of
the word 'matter' to include state-based claims within the accrued jurisdiction of
federal courts. In Philip Morris Incorporated v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd,
Mason J gave the following reason for preferring a broad interpretation of the word
'matter':
In deciding whether to attribute either a broad or a narrow content to 'matter', we should
take into account that the adoption of the broad meaning will lead to the speedier
determination of entire controversies between parties without undue duplication of
proceedings. Perhaps the adoption of this view will have some adverse consequences for
State courts, though this is by no means self-evident, but even if this be so, it is a
consideration which is secondary to the interests of litigants. This circumstance is an
additional reason for giving the word a broad rather than a narrow meaning. 158
This overt recognition of the underlying tension is also reflected in the judgment of
Wilson J, who balanced the competing interests the other way in adopting a more
limited view of the scope of federal jurisdiction: 159
I am conscious of, and burdened by, the consideration that such a conclusion may well
not be in the best interests of litigants, who naturally seek convenience and economy in
157 In Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 342, Gummow and Crennan JJ said that '[i]t has
been well said that Ch III gives practical effect to the assumption of the rule of law upon
which the Constitution depends for its efficacy', citing APLA Ltd v Legal Services
Commissioner (NSV) (2005) 224 CLR 322, 351-2 (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J). See also South
Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 62-3 (Gummow J); 156 (Crennan and Bell JJ).
158 (1981) 148 CLR 457, 514.
159 Ibid 548.
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the resolution of their disputes. However, burdened as I am by that consideration, it
seems to me that any other decision will not only offend the true intent and operation of
the Constitution as established by its proper construction but diminish its effectiveness in
maintaining a viable federation.
Other clear examples are found in the recognition of one common law, the rules of
precedent that operate to minimise divergence and diversity in common law rules
across jurisdictions and the choice of law context. In his preference for a unified
common law, Sir Owen Dixon was guided by the 'efficient administration of
justice'.160 His commitment to a unitary legal system led him to question the need for
'the American distinction between State and Federal jurisdiction'.161 The choice of law
context is one where the underlying tension between uniformity and diversity is very
well known. The application of different legal rules by different federal and state
forums may lead to inconvenient results, increasing the costs of litigation and the
expectations of the parties and their insurers. 162 The adoption of the law of the place of
tort by the High Court in Pfeiffer was said to prevent those expectations being
undermined1 63 and provide 'practical solutions to particular legal problems which
occur in the federal system'. 164
Rule of law arguments also surface, although less clearly, in the Kable judgments to
justify the imposition of Ch III limitations on state Parliaments. Of course, as has been
explained already, the Kable principles can be, in part, explained by an infiltration of
the separation of judicial power values of independence and impartiality. However,
there is also a rule of law thread to this reasoning that draws support from a preference
for uniform outcomes disciplined by central constitutional requirements over
uncontrolled state-based exercises of judicial power. Gaudron J's rejection in Kable of
'different grades or qualities of justice'165 reveals traces of this kind of rule of law
explanation. McHugh J proposed a narrower proposition that there are not 'two grades
of federal judicial power'.1 6 6 However, it is Gaudron J's formulation that has found
favour more recently in the majority judgments of the Court. 167
In these contexts, the interests of the litigants, derived from an efficient, predictable
and uniform resolution of their disputes, was used to enhance the national features
within Ch III at the expense of the distinctiveness of state legal and judicial systems.
That is not to say that a rule of law argument should be accepted as a basis for
centralising judicial power. The rule of law is notoriously an imprecise concept, and its
160 Dixon, 'Address by the Hon Sir Owen Dixon, KCMG to the Section of the American Bar
Association for International and Comparative Law', above n 101, 140.
161 Ibid. See also the evidence he gave to the Royal Commission on the Constitution:
Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1929) 110-
11.
162 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 536-9.
163 Ibid 536-7, 538, 540.
164 Ibid 528.
165 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 103.
166 Ibid 115.
167 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638, [123]; Wainohu v New
South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 209 (French CJ and Kiefel J), 228-9 (Gummow, Hayne,
Crennan and Bell JJ). See also Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 617-8 and
South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 37-39.
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acceptance as a constitutional assumption is suggestive, but not conclusive, of any
clear constitutional rule. However, there is a clear thread within the cases to that effect.
C Giving Parliament a real choice for the exercise of federal jurisdiction
Many of the developments discussed in Part IV can be explained along a very different
line to the first two explanations identified so far. As a reminder, Parliament can vest
federal jurisdiction in lower federal courts (s 77(i)) and/or utilise state courts for the
exercise of federal judicial power (s 77(iii)). One thread that can be found in the cases is
the idea that Ch III should be interpreted in a way that allows Parliament a real and
effective choice when deciding to vest federal jurisdiction in federal or state courts.
The interpretation of the word 'matter' provides a useful entry point into this idea.
As already explained, the expansive view of the word 'matter' was adopted initially by
a majority of the Court to preference the interests of the litigants over those of the
States. However, perhaps in response to claims that the majority was relying on
policy-rather than legal or constitutional - analysis, 168 the majority shifted its
justification for a broad conception of the federal justiciable controversy from the
interests of the litigants to the demands of an effective federal judicial system:
A central element in this design for the exercise of the judicial power of the
Commonwealth is the power given to Parliament to make a choice between conferring
federal jurisdiction on federal courts which it creates and investing federal jurisdiction in
state courts. There is no indication in Ch III that the making of this choice was to be
strongly weighted against the creation of federal courts in favour of investing federal
jurisdiction in state courts, as it would be if the Constitution were to deny power to give
authority to federal courts to decide the whole of a single justiciable controversy of which
a federal issue forms an integral part. ...
It would ... restrict Parliament to the creation of federal courts lacking jurisdiction to
determine such claims, thereby inhibiting their capacity as effective elements in the court
system for which Ch III makes provision. The preferable approach from the viewpoint of
principle is that established by authority, namely, to regard Ch III as empowering the
Parliament to make sensible and practical dispositions for determination of justiciable
controversies by either of the two means for which Ch III makes provision. 169
Thus, the recognition and expansion of the concept of accrued federal jurisdiction
in this way was designed to enhance the effectiveness of the choice available to the
federal Parliament under s 77(iii) of the Constitution for the exercise of
Commonwealth judicial power. 170 While favouring the interests of the litigants, this
explanation is grounded firmly in the federal (national) architecture of Ch III.
Indeed, many of the centralising Ch III developments can be plotted along this
plane. For example, uniformity of outcome (common law principles and choice of law
rules) in federal and state courts might be supported on the basis that disparate
outcomes might affect Parliament's choice between federal courts and state courts for
the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Parliament can control the legal rules to be applied
in state courts when they exercise federal jurisdiction, but it cannot control those rules
when state courts exercise state judicial power. The possibility that the imposition of
federal jurisdiction on state courts might lead to disparate outcomes depending on
168 Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 629 (Dawson J).
169 Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 261, 293-4.
170 See, eg, Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 609; Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983)
154 CLR 261, 293.
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whether state or federal jurisdiction is being exercised might affect that choice in
favour of federal courts. So too would the Kable principles. If Ch III did not impose the
Kable requirements of institutional integrity, impartiality, independence and fairness
on state courts, Parliament's choice might be significantly affected. 1 71 As Gummow,
Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said in K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing
Court, failure to adhere to these essential features would 'weaken the effectiveness of
the distinctive feature of Australian federalism represented by the general words of s
77(iii) of the Constitution'. 172
And, finally, the harmonisation of the rules about the exercise of federal jurisdiction
by non-judicial officers of federal and state courts in Harris v Caladine and Hospital
Contribution Fund can be explained on the same basis. Indeed, when concluding that
non-judicial officers of a state court can exercise federal jurisdiction, Mason J in
Hospital Contribution Fund emphasised that the effective exercise of federal jurisdiction,
which 'may intrude into the exercise of non-federal jurisdiction without the court or
the parties perceiving that a federal element has arisen', would be undermined. His
Honour concluded that '[t]here is no reflection in the provisions of Ch III of an
intention to submerge the exercise of federal jurisdiction in problems of this kind
173
In short, the centralising principles outlined in Part IV might be seen as an exercise
in keeping the scales evenly balanced to allow Parliament a real and effective choice
between its own courts and using state courts for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
VI CONCLUSION
In his article entitled 'The Nationalisation of the State Court System', Stephen McLeish
SC sparked interest in the converging features of Australian courts. In this article I
have sought to show that this undoubted convergence is part of a bigger picture: what
I have loosely described as the centralisation of judicial power in Australia. Not only
has there been a convergence of institutional design across federal and state courts and
increased federal power over court procedures and processes, High Court
jurisprudence has expanded the jurisdictional opportunities for the exercise of
Commonwealth judicial power and substantially achieved uniformity of outcome
across Australian courts. Although Ch III was designed to include both national and
confederal features, the integrating features have been relied upon and enhanced while
the distinctive features of state judicial systems have diminished. The reasons apparent
from the cases for such centralising trends include the nation-building efforts to break
free from colonial shackles, the rule of law advantages of a unitary legal system and
the facilitation of a real and effective choice for the federal Parliament when choosing
between state and federal courts for the exercise of federal judicial power.
Whether the pull of these centralising features warrants the erosion of
distinctiveness in state judicial systems is a question for another day. I will, however,
171 Indeed, Brendan Lim has argued that the Commonwealth has largely taken the position in
Kable cases supportive of the maintenance of these minimum requirements: above n 20, 59-
67.
172 (2009) 237 CLR 501, 544.
173 (1982) 150 CLR 49, 62. His Honour also expressed concern that a strict requirement that
federal jurisdiction be exercised by state court judges would 'constrain the States' freedom
of action in the organization of their courts' (at 62).
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conclude by offering four brief comments on the implications arising from these
centralising trends. First, High Court judges have been critical of the lack of
understanding of federal jurisdiction amongst law graduates, practitioners and lower
state courts. 1' 4 The provision of enhanced educational opportunities in relation to Ch
III of the Constitution is an important step 'to alleviate that ignorance'. 1 75 Secondly,
important policy questions are presented for the Commonwealth government as to
how it uses its power to vest federal jurisdiction and to control processes, practices,
procedures and choice of law rules in federal jurisdiction. For example, in Blunden v
Commonwealth, the High Court was critical of the Commonwealth's failure to enact
limitation rules for civil claims pursued in federal jurisdiction. 176 The Commonwealth
Parliament certainly has more power than it currently uses.
Thirdly, there are very large implications for state governments, particularly in the
design of their dispute resolution processes and institutions, whether courts or
tribunals, and the use of courts and judges in non-traditional ways. The growing trend
at the state and territory levels of transferring judicial jurisdiction to tribunals will,
sooner rather than later, bring these implications into sharper contrast. Finally, if there
is to be a federalism constitutional amendment agenda, judicial federalism needs to
take its place alongside legislative and fiscal federalism. In its 2011 report, the Senate
Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation devoted very little space
to the federal judicial system. 1 77 If the federal judicial system is to be reformed,
important questions to be considered might include whether, on the one hand, state
judicial systems should be capable of variation and experimentation in institutional
design, or, on the other hand, whether we instead conceive of the judiciary in
Australia, as Sir Owen Dixon once suggested, as an institution that should not have a
federal character or be burdened by the American conception of federal jurisdiction.
174 See, eg, Gordon v Tolcher [2005] HCATrans 843; The Hon Justice WMC Gummow, 'Cowen
and Zines's Federal Jurisdiction in Australia Third Edition, The Federation Press (2002)'
(2004) 32 Federal Law Review 163 (Book Review).
175 To adopt the comments from Gummow, above n 174, 168.
176 Blunden v Commonwealth (2003) 218 CLR 330, 346.
177 See Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation, above n 3.
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